Web services validating the sender Looking for mature granny chat in poland
The class will be configured with the username and password of the sender when SOAP messages are posted to the endpoint; use the appropriate getters to see these values.
Note that Axis does not yet integrate with the servlet API authentication stuff.
AOL) that may change the apparent origin of calls mid-session.
Any request that takes time to process is a DOS attack target, as it ties up the CPUs.
Clients can authenticate themselves with client certificates, or HTTP basic authentication.
The latter is too weak to be trustable on a non-encrypted channel, but works over HTTPS.
Unauthorized access to this data can be embarrasing and expensive.
Anything that gives read access to the file system is a security hole, letting people get at the code behind the site, often including database passwords and other sensitive data, plus of course there are the core parts of the underlying platform, which may contain important information: passwords, credit card lists, user-private information, and the like.
One of the key security holes in any Web Service is the code you write yourself.
It won't have as many eyes examining it as the Axis source gets, deadlines get in the way of rigorous testing, and a complex web service will bind to the valued items: private data, databases, other servers, etc, that you want to defend against. If your service takes XML from an attachment, or in a base-64 encoded string, parsing it as a standalone document, then you are exposed to all these attacks.
Some people, such as Bruce Schneier, have claimed that SOAP is a security disaster in the making, because of its ability to punch through firewalls.
However, because in SOAP over HTTP the client can only make SOAP calls, not receive them, SOAP is no more insecure than any other application which POSTs XML files to a web server.